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Bank restructuring is an inherent part of the gover-
nance of a country’s financial system. Under normal
(i.e., non-crisis) circumstances, an individual bank
may occasionally become insolvent and the authori-
ties have several options (typically provided in the
law) to resolve this bank (Hoelscher 2002).These op-
tions include,among others,the sale of the bank as a
going concern to a third party, a merger, a purchase
and assumption (P&A) agreement,or liquidation and
deposit payout.Typically,the authorities already start
preparing for one of these options when it becomes
clear that the bank is beyond rescue.1
In a systemic banking crisis – the focus of this paper
– these techniques are in principle also available to
the authorities.However,bank restructuring in a sys-
temic crisis differs in a number of essential and in-
tertwined aspects from the restructuring in case of an
isolated bank failure.First of all,the size of the prob-
lem is by definition bigger – typically large segments
of the system are affected and their problems threat-
en to bring the payments system to a halt. From this
follow the two other key differences.Second,because
of this threat,speed of intervention is of essence.The
time to look for a partner for a merger or P&A agree-
ment, or apply other private-sector solutions is in
many cases limited to a weekend and therefore not
feasible.Third, and most importantly, because of the
size and the speed required, government support, be
it under the form of guarantees or recapitalization,is
inevitable to address the problems.Private sector so-
lutions,although preferably in principle,are less ade-
quate, not only because of the need for speedy solu-
tions mentioned earlier but also because of the size
of the problem.2 Moreover, systemic banking crises
typically trigger economic downturns, which make it
extremely hard to find fresh funds in the private sec-
tor to recapitalize the banks.
Managing a systemic financial crisis is undoubtedly
one of the most delicate and complex operations a
government can possibly face because of the multi-
tude of interests that are at stake.3 Addressing a sys-
temic crisis in a swift manner and head-on is essen-
tial, not only to prevent failing banks from dragging
other banks into the crisis but also to mitigate the im-
pact of the financial crisis on the real economy.
Indeed, both the 1997–98 Asian and the current fi-
nancial crises have clearly demonstrated that the im-
pact of systemic financial crises on the real economy
can be devastating in terms of output loss.4
Managing a systemic crisis – from the day the crisis is
recognized as systemic until the day that the system
returns to normal – requires a wide variety of pro-
fessional skills.In fact,throughout the crisis,manage-
ment requires a balancing act between macro- and
micro-level decisions.The former concern the broad
strategy to be followed to restore the financial sys-
tem’s intermediation function. These decisions are
typically influenced by political-economy considera-
tions. The latter involve a multitude of extremely
technical decisions regarding the restructuring of in-
dividual institutions. Such decisions involve supervi-
sors,accountants,auditors and lawyers,to name a few
professional categories.
Systemic crises often give a very chaotic impression,
particularly at the beginning.However,crisis manage-
ment can be divided into three interconnected com-
ponents. First, once a country is in a state of crisis, the
main task for the government is to stop the crisis from
spreading, i.e., to stop further contagion.The govern-
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4 See for instance, Cerra and Saxena (2008).ment needs to stabilize the financial system and try to
restore public confidence.The second component is to
restore a viable financial system – the restructuring
stage. Finally the third component is the implementa-
tion of a strategy for dealing with the impaired assets
(“toxic” or “legacy” assets as they have been labeled
in the current crisis) in the system.These steps should
gradually bring the system back to normalcy.
The three components of systemic crisis
management
Crisis management can be separated into three com-
ponents. This section offers a short overview of the
essence of these three components, in order to have
a better understanding as to where bank restructur-
ing enters the picture.
Crisis containment
Once the systemic nature of a crisis has been recog-
nized,the authorities (in a coordinated action between
the government, central bank and financial supervi-
sors) should take measures to prevent the crisis from
spreading throughout the system.The priority is to stop
or prevent runs on banks by restoring the public’s con-
fidence in the financial system.Experience from sever-
al systemic crises since the mid-1990s shows that crisis
containment relies on a combination of measures which
is likely to differ from situation to situation and from
country to country (Hoelscher and Quintyn 2003).
These measures include (i) expanding the coverage of
the deposit guarantee scheme; (ii) or even providing
a “blanket guarantee”(a government promise that all
deposits in the system will be guaranteed by the gov-
ernment); (iii) the provision of lender-of-last-resort
support, perhaps at less stringent conditions than in
normal times; and (iv) the immediate closure of
deeply insolvent banks to show the markets the gov-
ernment’s decisiveness.In some cases,these measures
need to be accompanied by macroeconomic policy
measures to help restore confidence.If all these mea-
sures fail in stabilizing the system, the government’s
last resort is often administrative measures, such as
closing the system for a number of days (partial or
full) securitization of deposits,extending deposit ma-
turities,or an outright deposit freeze.However,some
of these measures,such as closing the system for a few
days or a deposit freeze,do not really solve the prob-
lem;they just buy time for the government.If the gov-
ernment, in such circumstances, does not come up
with a credible solution, such measures often lead to
a further deterioration of the public’s confidence.
Bank restructuring
Once the situation is more or less stabilized, the au-
thorities’ attention should shift to restoring the fi-
nancial system’s intermediation function. The gov-
ernment should take stock of the state of the bank-
ing system and establish a restructuring strategy.
Experience has shown that implementation of this
strategy can take between a few months and years.
Impaired asset management
Bank restructuring should be accompanied by a strat-
egy to manage the impaired assets on the banks’ bal-
ance sheets. Components two and three are comple-
mentary,in that the management of the impaired as-
sets is part of the restructuring.However,other strate-
gic decisions also need to be taken with respect to the
management of impaired assets, such as the types of
assets to be taken over and whether a private or a
public sector solution for the management of these
assets is favored.
These three components should not be interpreted as
totally sequential. Phases two and three often start
before phase one has come to a satisfactory end be-
cause of the need to keep the momentum of crisis
management going.
Methods for restructuring the banking system
Ideally, when entering the restructuring phase, the
government should be guided by a clear strategy
whose main objectives should be5(i) to restore the vi-
ability of the banking system as soon as feasible so
that it can resume its role of mobilizer and allocator
of financial resources in the economy;(ii) to provide
throughout the process an appropriate incentive
structure for all stakeholders; (iii) to minimize the
cost for the government – and hence the taxpayer –
by managing the process efficiently and aiming for a
fair burden sharing by all stakeholders.6
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Bank restructuring is typically a lengthy process. In
emerging and developing markets the process often
has to start with the establishment of a workable le-
gal and institutional framework for bank restructur-
ing.In recent years,several countries,faced with a sys-
temic crisis, came to the conclusion that their legal
framework to deal with a massive bank restructuring
is outdated at best or nonexistent at worst. Precious
time can be lost in these circumstances, resulting in
continuing losses in asset values.
As a first step of this strategy, the balance sheets of
all affected banks should be valued in order to assess
their viability.This is a tedious,yet important,under-
taking. Valuation should be done by outsiders and
should use a standardized methodology to allow com-
parisons between banks.On the basis of this valuation
it should be decided whether a bank is (i) insolvent
and unviable,(ii) undercapitalized but viable and (iii)
viable and meeting all (or most) solvency criteria.The
first category should be resolved on the basis of the
techniques listed in the introduction to this paper.The
last category does not need much attention as they
have survived the crisis.The restructuring should fo-
cus on the middle category as well as the too big to
fail (TBTF), or systemically important institutions
which could be either in categories (i) or (ii) but for
which the decision has been taken to rescue them in
any case. It should be noted that in a systemic crisis
like the Asian crisis,it was important that more banks
than just the systemically important were rescued be-
cause otherwise several layers of the population
would have been deprived of banking services. Even
a number of clearly insolvent banks were rescued for
the same reason.
This “triage” process can be done in various ways. In
the Asian crisis it was carried out for a large number
of banks more or less simultaneously because the cri-
sis hit many institutions within days.After their valu-
ation and classification, a restructuring strategy was
defined.In the current financial crisis,which came in
waves, the diagnosing was done primarily on a case-
by-case basis,particularly in the initial stages.As a re-
sult several governments also started off by taking
stand-alone, or case-by-case, support actions. Only
when the crisis became more pervasive, did govern-
ments move towards comprehensive support pack-
ages (BIS 2009).
By establishing these categories,the government has
set out the eligibility criteria for its assistance in re-
structuring. Further decisions concern the following
issues:
• whether assistance to all institutions in this catego-
ry is mandatory or whether institutions are free to
ask for assistance under the program. If access is
not mandatory,the (supervisory) authorities should
request binding business plans from those institu-
tions that opt not to take government assistance.
These plans should lay out, among others, a time-
bound strategy for private recapitalization. Com-
pliance with these business plans should be moni-
tored frequently to ensure that the institution is be-
ing recapitalized and complies with the superviso-
ry rules and regulations within the agreed time-
frame;
• the conditions that the government wishes to at-
tach to the use of its funding or guarantees.These
conditions may range from the submission of a
business plan to the influence the government
wishes to have in the institutions’ decision-making
process, the treatment of the existing sharehold-
ers’ claims, the payment of dividends and all sorts
of other aspects of the bank’s operations.
• the size of the assistance. The size could be ex-
pressed in terms of a target level of recapitalization.
This level should be the same for all eligible insti-
tutions but may vary according to the general cir-
cumstances.For instance,it can be argued that when
the government has extended a blanket guarantee
to all deposits,recapitalization to a zero capital ad-
equacy requirement (CAR) is sufficient.However,
given limited availability of private funding sources
under the circumstances, this level of recapitaliza-
tion may not be sufficient and the government may
opt for some minimum positive CAR level (Enoch
et al. 2002). The other parameter, of course, is the
state of the government’s finances.
Even if the plan is not mandatory, it is expected that
in a systemic crisis most banks would take advantage
of it,mainly because of the size of the problems (loss
of capital,percentage of impaired assets) and the lack
of alternative funding sources. However, if the gov-
ernment’s conditions are considered too harsh,some
institutions may try to gamble their way out of the cri-
sis without relying on the government.
Restructuring of the undercapitalized but viable in-
stitutions, including the TBTF category under a gov-
7 Some authors include blanket deposit guarantees under this type
of restructuring. We consider this measure more as a measure to
contain the crisis and to restore confidence.However,it is true that
one of the effects of a blanket guarantee is that it avoids the poten-
tial losses from selling assets at fire-sales and from high-cost bor-
rowing to repay depositors.ernment-led strategy,can take three forms:(i) recap-
italization;(ii) guarantees on debt,assets or income7;
and (iii) asset purchases. Most crisis-countries have
been using combinations of these methods to en-
hance the effectiveness of their operations. For in-
stance, while capital injections may be needed, they
have no direct impact on the portfolio of impaired as-
sets,which often prevents the banks from generating
new loans and new cash flow.
Recapitalization8
Capital can be injected using Tier 1 or Tier 2 instru-
ments.Tier 1 capital is the preferred method because
it improves the banks’ capital ratios, can enhance
profitability and is essential under the Basel Capital
Accord. Moreover, the government’s provision of
Tier 1 capital can facilitate the bank’s efforts to raise
Tier 2 capital from other sources.
In any capital injection operation, the government
needs to make a decision regarding the instruments
to be used and how to pay for them.The choice of in-
strument depends,inter alia,on the government’s fu-
ture plans with the bank(s). If the capital injection is
seen as temporary, i.e., the government wants to re-
cover its investment when the bank is profitable
again,common stock would be preferable because of
its marketability.However,with common stock come
voting rights, and the government might not be will-
ing to exercise these – or the government may believe
that its voting rights will reduce the private sector’s
appetite to invest in this bank. In that case, convert-
ible preferred stock would be a better option. This
would also count as Tier 1.
In terms of payment, the government may pay in cash
or bonds. Use of bonds is the most common practice
when governments inject capital. They increase the
bank’s net worth,improve capital ratios (because gov-
ernment bonds are risk-free assets under the Basel
standards), liquidity and potential profitability. How-
ever,bonds should pay market-based interest rates.
To attract fresh private sector capital,the government
may attach some incentives.For instance,under some
of the recap programs in the Asian crisis, govern-
ments promised they would match fresh private cap-
ital injections (in varying proportions) with their as-
sistance.9
Providing guarantees on debt, assets or income
As part of the recapitalization operation, govern-
ments can also provide explicit guarantees on bank
debt,assets or income,or a combination of all three.
Depending on which specific guarantees are ap-
plied, these can have positive effects on either as-
sets values, the balance sheet, capital ratio and/or
liquidity. For the government, the advantage asso-
ciated with such guarantees is that they do not di-
rectly involve taxpayers’ money.So they carry some
political appeal. However, they all create a contin-
gent liability which the government may have to
honor and which may in the end make things politi-
cally worse.
Debt guarantees protect against default on bank debt
and other non-deposit liabilities (BIS 2009).The ad-
vantage for the financial institutions is that such guar-
antee helps them maintain access to medium-term
funding at a reasonable cost in circumstances when
private funding is drying up.Liquidity risks and over-
all borrowing costs are reduced through this form of
assistance.
Governments can also assume part or all of the risks
of a portfolio of impaired or illiquid assets. Such as-
set guarantees remove the tail risk of insured portfo-
lios from bank’s balance sheets (BIS 2009).
Guarantees can also take the form of providing as-
sistance to the borrowers of a bank – frequently the
corporate sector.Such support for the corporate sec-
tor may be part of an overall strategy for handling a
pervasive economic crisis (Enoch et al. 2002).
Finally, income guarantees (for instance through
“stop-loss guarantees”) allow banks to increase cap-
ital through retained earnings. This type of guaran-
tees may be attractive to prospective bank purchasers
in case of uncertainty about the value of the bank’s
assets and prospects for recovery.
Asset purchases 
A final method for bank restructuring is the purchase
of impaired assets by the government. Asset pur-
chases should be part of a broader program of asset
rehabilitation (see below).Asset purchases can in fact
be both a complement to,and a substitute for,capital
injections. The asset rehabilitation program as a
whole should enhance the effectiveness of the capital
CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 6
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injection program in supporting economic recovery
and may even provide capital relief.
Asset purchases are a complement to recapitalization
programs.Indeed capital injections as such may not be
sufficient as banks,sitting on piles of distressed assets,
cannot jumpstart their lending activities. Asset pur-
chase programs improve bank liquidity and accelerate
the restart of the banks’ intermediation function.
Asset purchases can also be a substitute for recapi-
talization programs if the government buys the assets
at book value or a higher price.This can be an explicit
goal of the restructuring program, but it can also be
a disguised capital injection. Conversely, if the gov-
ernment buys below book value, it implies a forced
write-down by the bank. Indeed one of the issues in
a systemic crisis,when price discovery in the financial
markets is hampered,is to establish the right price for
many categories of distressed assets.
Asset rehabilitation 
As indicated earlier, programs to purchase impaired
assets should be part of a broader asset rehabilitation
strategy which is intended to accelerate the econom-
ic recovery – the third component of crisis manage-
ment.As such, asset rehabilitation is an integral part
of a bank restructuring strategy in times of a systemic
crisis. At the same time, experience worldwide sug-
gests that this third component of crisis management
is often the most protracted one. Once the momen-
tum of crisis management is gone, the urge to reha-
bilitate assets diminishes, particularly when a gov-
ernment agency is in charge.10
The objectives of asset rehabilitation should be to
maximize the value of the impaired assets, and mini-
mize bank losses and capital erosion. Establishing a
rehabilitation program entails a number of strategic
choices.In principle,three options present themselves
for the management of bad or impaired assets.They
can be (i) retained and managed by the banks them-
selves at appropriately written-down values,allowing
the government to limit its actions to capital injec-
tions.Banks are then in charge of writing them off or
restructuring them; (ii) relocated or sold to a “bad
bank”,loan recovery company or privately-owned as-
set management company that is specialized in the
management of distressed assets; or (iii) sold and
transferred to a centralized asset management com-
pany, which is in most cases state-owned.
The choices between these three options (and a com-
bination of them is again not excluded) depend on
such factors as the relative size of the portfolio of im-
paired assets economy-wide,and the type of assets in-
volved. For instance, non-performing loans of bor-
10 Klingebiel (2000) documents, for a number of asset management
companies around the world, the number of years impaired assets
stay on the books until they completely lose their value.
Box
Experience during the current financial crisis

The current financial crisis started in 2007, but intensified significantly in the fall of 2008 after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. In the wake of this event, governments started to provide assistance to
troubled financial institutions, first through standalone interventions and subsequently increasingly
through system-wide support programs.
Initially most government interventions were concentrated on capital injections and debt
guarantees. All ofthe most-hit advanced countries have taken measures of either type.Mostof these
interventions were offered on a system-wide basis. Fewer countries, and only at later stages,
engaged in programs to remove impaired assets, or to guarantee assets. In addition, in most cases
these programs were only accessible to big systemic institutions. Only more recently did a greater 
number of countries engage in this restructuring method, and on a system-wide basis. This sequence
seems to indicate that the first attempts at restructuring through capital injections failed to reach
their goals, and that measures to address illiquid assets were needed to fully restore confidence. BIS 
(2009) shows indeed that those banks that received big(ger) capital injections were also the ones
that participated most actively in asset purchase and guarantee programs.
According to BIS (2009), government interventions in the UK (capital injections, asset purchases
and the exposure in cases of guarantees) have been the highest, both in terms of banking sector
assets and GDP (respectively close to 9 percent and 55 percent). Relative to banking assets, the US
rank second,while the Netherlands rank second in terms of GDP.
______________________
 This box draws on BIS (2009).rowers who are likely to honor their contracts,as well
as small loans should preferably remain on the banks’
books, because banks have a personal relationship
with these borrowers and are therefore more likely
to succeed in the recovery process. Standardized as-
sets,on the other hand,could be transferred out of the
banks’ books.Experience shows that privately-owned
asset recovery companies act faster and more effec-
tively. On the other hand, government-owned and
centralized companies seem more efficient when the
problem is vast, when special recovery powers are
needed, or when required skills are scarce.11
If the choice is for a government-owned agency, a
number of strategic questions – mainly related to the
fairness of the program – need to be dealt with first.
The first one is the purchases price, an issue that we
have discussed before.A second question is whether
the government should buy from all banks or only
from the weaker ones. Only buying from the under-
capitalized ones may put the better-run banks at a dis-
advantage when handling their own impaired portfo-
lio without assistance. A fair solution would be to
leave the weaker banks with a distress portfolio of,
roughly, the size of the better banks’ distressed port-
folio. More generally, the government should never
buy the entire impaired portfolio.This would create
even more moral hazard as it relieves the banks from
undertaking any portfolio rehabilitation effort. The
third question is whether the company should only
buy impaired assets or also good ones.The asset com-
pany might indeed be tempted to buy good ones as
well, to increase its return.The solution to this ques-
tion could be that either “fair prices” are established
or that the sales concern specific asset categories such
as “loss” or “doubtful.”
Conclusions
Managing a systemic banking crisis – very often a
once-in-a-generation event – requires a lot of imagi-
nation from the government in the broadest sense of
the word. Creative measures need to be invented to
contain the crisis as soon as feasible by restoring the
public’s confidence.To restructure the system,i.e.,to
restore its intermediation function, a similar dose of
creativity is needed.
Since in a systemic crisis private sector solutions (such
as recapitalization with private funding, debt-to-equi-
ty conversions,and private sector initiated mergers and
acquisitions) are not sufficient or feasible,government
funding is necessary, despite the moral hazard effects
associated with it.Government-led bank restructuring
has the option of injecting capital, providing guaran-
tees on debt, assets or income and purchasing assets.
In most crises, a combination of these methods has
been used to enhance the effectiveness of the assis-
tance. Purchasing impaired assets is part of a broader
strategy to rehabilitate impaired assets, which should
also assist economic recovery. A recent BIS study
shows that during the current financial crisis, several
countries used combinations of restructuring methods
to bring their financial system back on track.
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